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Year of Reckoning
This is the year of reckoning for many
creative financing deals that involve homes
purchased between 1980 and 1982. Many
recent homeowners will soon have to refi-
nancepartorall ofthebalanceoftheirhome
mortgages unless theycan comeupwiththe
necessary cash. Estimates ofthe magnitude
of the required refinancing vary, butthe
amount is likelyto be substantial because
short-term creative financing has been a
major alternative source ofresidential
mortgage funds in lieu ofbank- or S&L-
originated mortgages.
As we shall use the term, creative financing
refers to some sortofseller-assisted fi-
nancingat rates belowprevailing mortgage
rates. Mostsuch loanswere to mature in live
years or less, and, becausethe monthlypay-
ments were frequently amortized over 30
years, involved substantial lump sum pay-
ments at maturity. Because ofthe latter
feature, foreclosures associated with
creative financing have risen recently.
However,with thedecline in mortgagerates
and the modest increases in incomes and
home values overthe past year, most
creative financing deals nowcoming due
should notencounter serious refinancing
problems even though homeowners will
find the new monthly payments higher than
they had perhaps anticipated.
Affordability
Back in the halcyon days ofthe late 1970s,
creative financing was relatively uncom-
mon. There was no need for it. The pace of
home sales was brisk, prices seemed on an
unending upward spiral and mortgage rates
were sufficiently lowthat initial payments
did notabsorban unmanageableproportion
.ofhomebuyers' current income.
The boom years for housing came to an end
rather abruptly, however. As the inflation
rate climbed towardsthe double-digit range,
financial markets began to revise their infla-
tion expectations upward, demanding
higher inflation premia on their long-term
investments, including mortgages. More-
over, on October6,1979, the Federal
Reserve made a fundamental change in
policy that resulted in tightening the avail-
abilityofcredit. The effectofaccelerating
inflation as well as the credittighteningwas
a nearly unprecedented rise in interest rates
(including mortgage rates) that wreaked
havoc in the housing market. Suddenly,
house prices that were attractive when
mortgage rates were 10 to 11 percent
seemed outrageously high with rates in the
17 to 18 percent range. Because potential
homebuyers simply did not have sufficient
current incometo meet the larger mortgage
payments and because mortgage contracts
did not permit them to borrow against
(higher) expected future income, the high
rates precipitated a significant drop in the
demand for housing.
Enter creative financing
Faced with the prospect ofhaving to offer
substantial price discounts in order to sell
theirhomes, homeowners and developers
frequently proposed creative financing
instead. Developers began to offer interest
rate "buydowns" wherebythe developer
eitherobtained shorter-term financing at
market rates orcompensated the mortgage
originatorforgivingfirstmortgages to buyers
at below-market rates for the lirst few years
ofthe mortgage.
Homeowners wishing to sell their homes
frequently agreed to provide prospective
buyers with subsidized short-term first or
second mortgages. Several state court deci-
sions, the most notableofwhich was the
so-called Wellenkamp decision in Cali-
fornia, encouraged tile use ofseller-assisted
financing by declaringthatexistingfirst
mortgages originated by banks and state-
chartered savings and loan associations
could be transferred to the new homebuyer.IF®cdl ~rr' i6~rr TI«®~®rrw'~
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Since the older mortgage generally carried
lower rates than prevailing mortgage rates,
the prospective homebuyer frequently
assumed the existing first mortgage and
obtained a subsidized second mortgage
from the seller to make up the balance,
Surveys conducted by the National Associ-
ation ofRealtors and the National Associa-
tion of Homebuilders suggest that the
incidence ofcreative financing between
1980 and 1982 was indeed high, An esti-
mated two-thirds ofhomebuilders offered
buydownson newhomes in 1981 and 1982
and an estimated 60 percent ofthe sales of
existing homes involved creative financing
during 1981, In California, the incidence of
creative financing was even higher-the
California Association of Realtors estimates
that 77 percent and 74 percent ofall sales
involved creative financing in 1981 and
1982, respectively,
, Such creative financing short-circuited the
normal process offinancial intermediation
in the housing market, and reduced the
financial intermediaries' share ofmortgage
originations, Theirsharefell from an average
of 70 percent ofthe value ofhomes sold in
the 1970s to SO percent ofthe value of
homes sold between 1980 and 1982,
The effect ofbreaking down the intermedi-
ation process was to introduce economic
inefficiency and greaterrisk intothe housing
market Unlike individual investors, finan-
cial intermediaries are able to realize
economies from specialization. For exam-
ple, by specializing in lending and credit
evaluation, financial institutions can eval-
uate apotential borrower'screditworthiness
more cheaply or with fewer errors in judg-
ment than can an individual lender. More-
over, financial institutionsare able to reduce
the risk ofdefault by diversifying their port-
folios. Individuals who decide to invest
some oftheirequity in loans to homebuyers,
by contrast, may have to accept higher
levels ofportfolio risk for a given rate of
return than they would by investing in the
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liabilities offinancial intermediaries (i.e., by
placing theirdeposits in intermediaries for
them to lend out as mortgage loans).
Why creative financing?
Why then did creative financing become
such apopularmeansofselling homes if, by
circumventing the financial intermediaries,
it introduced increasedinefficiencies and
risk into housing finance? After all, home-
sellers couldhave offered price reductions
which would have given homebuyers the
same benefits while using conventional
financing.
That both homebuyers and sellers preferred
creativefinancingcan be attributed, in some
measure, to their expectations ofan immi-
nentdecline in mortgage rates and a return
to the upward trend in home prices and
incomes that had characterized the mid- to
late-1970s. Given these expectations, the
risks ofcreative financing did not appear (ex
ante) tooutweighthe benefits. The expected
decline in mortgage rates would enable the
homebuyers to refinance the purchase on
reasonably favorable terms, whilethe ex-
pected rise in housing prices would reduce
the risk ofdefault forthe homeseller.
These expectations alone do notexplain
the popularityofcreative financing, how-
ever. For the potential buyer, the lower
initial payments associated with creative
financing enabled him pr herto overcome
otherwise binding cash flow constraints.
Price discounts ofequivalent market value,
by contrast, would have been amortized
over the 30-year Iife ofthe mortgage and
would nothave reduced monthly payments
enough to overcome initial cash flow con-
straints. In essence, creative financing
permitted thebuyertoborrowagainst higher
future incomeby movingall the benefits ofa
price discount forward.
Sellers also had reasons to prefer creative
financing to outright price discounts. In a
numberofstates, restrictions on traditional
lenders' ability to enforce due-on-saleclauses in mortgage contracts provided
existing homeowners with a valuable asset
-thatofthe low interest rate mortgage
which could be transferred to potential
homebuyers. The stream oflowerpayments
associated with a $50,000 mortgage with a
contractual interest rate of 10 percent when
prevailing rates were 18 percent, for exam-
ple, was worth more than $20,000 (dis-
counted at the prevailing mortgage rate
of 18 percent.)*
To realize the value ofthis asset, however,
the homeseller frequently had to offerthe
buyer a second mortgage to make upthe
difference between the down payment and
the purchase price less the face valueofthe
assumalJle existing mortgage. Although
seller-dlrried second mortgages entailed
defaultand liquidityrisks alreadydescribed,
such arrangements, even at subsidized rates,
were clearly in the seller's interest, given the
typical terms ofthese second mortgages. In
California, where the Wellenkamp decision
made conventional first mortgage loans
assumable, over halfofall resales are esti-
mated to have involved assumptions offirst
mortgages supplemented by creative finan-
cing involvingsecond and even other
"junior" mortgages.
A further reason that creative financing was
cheaper to offer than outright price dis-
counts was that ,it permitted relatively
wealthier households to transfer tax benefits
to less wealthy households. Because ofthe
income tax-deductibility ofmortgage inter-
est payments, households in high income
tax brackets couId borrow more cheaply
(after taxes) than could households in lower
tax brackets. Therefore, relatively wealthier
households could realize a gain by lending
some oftheirequity to potential home-
buyers at below-market rates and, in turn,
borrowing a larger portion ofthe purchase
price ofthe homes they intended to buy.
*This example assumes that a homeowner




Given the incentives to use creative
financing and the apparently widespread
expectation thatthe housing and housing
finance markets would soon improve, it is
no mystery that creative financing became
so popular. In hindsight, however, the
creative financing gamble seems far riskier
than many had anticipated. Interest rates,
particularly in real terms, have remained
high by historical standards. Households,
whose lumpsum payments come due this
year will either have to struggle with the
higher-thancanticipated monthly payments
these rates imply (their incomes may have
risen slowly), sell in a still weak resale
market or try to renegotiate terms with the
seller-lenderto avoid foreclosure.
Unfortunately, foreclosure has been forced
upon some homebuyers involved in creative
financing deals. In the first quarterof 1983,
0.9 percent ofall mortgage loans in Califor-
nia were in the process offoreclosure-up
from 0.2 percent in the first quarterof 1980
-and 5.7 percent had payments past due
(compared to4.7 percentpast due in the first
quarter of 1980). Ofcourse, it is difficultto
separate the impact of.creative financing
from that ofageneral economicand housing
downturn, butone recent study by the Uni-
versity ofSouthern California found that
foreclosures are running 10 to 20 percent
higheron creatively financed home pur-
chases than on those conventionally
financed.
Improved outlook
Creative financing represented agamble on
the future by the homebuyerand a promo-
tional tool using tax laws and assumable
mortgages by the seller. For atime, itdid
notseem to payoffas foreclosures increased
because the housing industry, alongwiththe
rest ofthe economy, suffered from the reces-
sion longer than expected. Now, with signs
ofgathering strength in the housing industry
and the prospect that mortgage rates wiII
moderate overthe next few years, home-
owners whose unamortized debt is coming
due should be able to breathe easier.
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loans (gross, adjusted) and iiwestments* 161,706 402 30 0.0
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 141,204 837 - 30 - 0.0
Commercial and industrial 43,458 26 - 887 - 2.0
Real estate 56,454 34 - 1,138 - 2.0
Loans to individuals 24,140 91 787 3.4
Securities loans 2,873 527 152 5.6
U.s. Treasury securities* 7,431 - 390 965 14.9
Othersecurities* 13,070 - 45 - 905 - 6.5
Demand deposits - total# 41,676 580 3,047 7.9
Demand deposits - adjusted 29,411 - 367 2,467 9.2
Savings deposits - totalt 66,003 - 380 35,086 113.5
Timedeposits - total# 66,629 420 - 33,686 - 33.6
Individuals, part. & corp. 61,075 362 - 29,508 - 32.6
(Large negotiableCO's) 18,119 - 79 - 19,805 - 52.2
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings

















# Includes items not shown separately.
t Includes Money Market Deposit Accounts, Super-NOW accounts, and NOWaccounts.
Editorial comments maybeaddressed to theeditor(Gregory Tong)ortotheauthor ....Freecopiesof
this and other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling or writing-the Public Infor-
mation Section, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702~ San Frand_sco 94120. Phone
(415) 974-2246. .